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Abstract
The period since the 1990s witnessed a strong economic performance and labor demand in many
countries in the Middle East, East Asia, and West, which coincided with the major political
turmoil in Nepal causing enormous increase in emigration and foreign remittance. Using microdata for 1996 and 2004, this paper examines foreign remittance to Nepal and its socioeconomic
implications. While the increasing values of foreign remittance have some positive effects on
reducing poverty and income inequality, findings suggest that most of the benefits may have
favored the socioeconomically more advantaged sections of society. The paper discuses
implications of these and other findings in the changing socioeconomic and policy contexts in
Nepal.
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I. Background
Nepal has a long history of foreign employment with remittance playing an important role in the
livelihood of many people. Nepalis fought bravely during the first and second World Wars
helping the British and other allied forces to fulfill their national interests and supporting their
families back-home in return. Employment in the vast public as well as private sectors of India
has always been one of the major sources of financial support for families throughout Nepal.
This possibility of foreign employment served as a source of hope for the mostly uneducated and
unskilled young workers in Nepal at a time when the country’s public and especially private
sectors were highly underdeveloped. Although employment opportunities markedly increased
during the last two decades in Nepal, these increases have not kept up with a massive increase in
job-seekers especially aided by a combination of rapid population growth, sluggish economic
growth, and limited agricultural potential.
The more recent turn of events with greater economic openness and increasing political
instability caused by the decade-long Maoist insurgency has fueled joblessness among the
uneducated and semi-educated public. Internationally, many countries in the Middle East and
East Asia have witnessed massive surge in economic growth necessitating workers to man their
factories, farms, and facilities in various capacities. Demand for low wage labor also increased in
the West as the rising cost of living caused domestic labor to be relatively more expensive and
migrant workers from countries like Nepal better job and employment prospect. Consequently,
the flow of workers abroad (other than India) for employment soared to 184,000 in 2005 and
233,000 in 2007 from a mere 2,000 in 1995 (NIDS 2007, 2008).1 For India, this number tops one
million with the open worker mobility options making systematic record-keeping difficult and
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unreliable (NIDS 2008; Seddon, Adhikari, and Gurung 2002).
Foreign employment has generated enormous remittance money, transforming the agricultural
economy of Nepal into a remittance economy. The official data summarized in Figure 1 show,
for example, that the real value of remittance to Nepal increased 76 folds during the 18 years
since 1991 with the 2008 remittance reaching over NPR 139 billion (equivalent to US$2 billion).
This change reflects a 40 times increase in the ratio of remittance to the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) during this period, up from less than one half of one percent during the early 1990s to
over 18 percent by 2008. This substantiates the role that the foreign employment is playing in the
macroeconomic system of Nepal with substantial portions of families receiving remittance—
close to 18 percent in 2004 compared to 11 percent in 1996 (CBS/Nepal 2004). Given the
inability of these official sources of data to incorporate the number of workers employed abroad
illegally as well as the money received using means other than banks or formal transfer channels,
the actual ratio of remittance to GDP could increase many folds (Kollmair, Manandhar, Subedi,
and Thieme 2006; NIDS 2007, 2008; Seddon 2005; Seddon et al. 2002).
(Figure 1)
These changes in foreign employment and remittance to Nepal have important implications
for the economy as well as society. Remittance has played an increasingly pivotal role in
narrowing down the trade deficit caused by shrinking exports and bloating imports. During the
eight years ending in 2008 alone, for example, the real trade deficit for goods and services
increased by almost 150 percent, indicating the necessity of alternative sources of foreign
currency such as remittance to narrow the gap (Nepal Rastra Bank 2009; NIDS 2007, 2008). At
the family level, this allowed families to increase incomes, consumption, savings, and asset
formation, greatly affecting the overall economic activities and well-being (Thieme and Wyss
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205; Wagle 2009a). The widely touted declining poverty figures (from 42 percent in 1996 to 31
percent in 2004) are attributed to the increasing remittance receipts (Central Bureau of Statistics
1997, 2004; NIDS 2008) with econometric analyses and simulations attributing 20 percent of
these declines to remittances (Lokshin, Bontch-Osmolovski, and Glinskaya 2007). These direct
effects of remittance compound with multiplier effects generating enormous impetus for the
overall economic growth due to the interconnectedness of remittance with such other sectors as
the real estate, construction, banking and investment, trade, healthcare, and education (Wagle
2009a).
In a strict economic sense, remittance guarantees a win-win situation in the recipient society
with added revenues and benefits to the government, economy, community, and families. It can
help improve the economic well-being of recipient families and reduce poverty (Adams 2005;
Adams, Cuecuecha, and Page 2008; Gustafsson and Makonnen 1993; Du, Park, and Wang
2005). It can also reduce economic inequality, to the extent that the increased benefits accrue to
those in the lower stratum of income distribution (Gonzalez-Konig and Wodon 2005; Fajnzylber
and López 2007). At the same time, however, it can also increase economic inequality forcing
the families unable to receive such incomes to economic, social, and psychological deprivation.
If the financial and social investment in cultivating paths to migration succeeds, it maximizes the
potential for return stimulating further migration (Bhandari 2004; Bohra and Massey 2009;
Graner 2001; Thieme and Wyss 2005), causing a disadvantage to those unable to make such
investments. Polarization in consumption, asset formation, and human capital developments can
adversely affect the well-being of current as well as future generations. In Nepal, this
polarization is already evident between urban and rural areas as well as within major urban areas
like Kathmandu where rampant influx of people has caused skyrocketing real estate prices and
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booming construction and other related industries (Wagle 2009b).
This paper examines changes in foreign employment and remittance to Nepal during the mid1990s and early-to-mid 2000s. The intent is to identify the role of foreign remittance in income,
poverty, and inequality and tease out their nuanced implications for various socioeconomic
groups in meaningfully participating in this growing economic activity. Since foreign remittance,
just like any other economic activity, can create winners and losers, who has benefitted and who
has not can offer important insight for future policymaking. Given that the presence and amount
of foreign remittance depends on one’s social and economic footing, this analysis incorporates
the roles of socioeconomic characteristics of the receiving families as well as those of the
migrant workers. While foreign remittance soared further during the period after the 2000s, the
period of 1996 and 2004 is chosen due to data availability reasons. Since nationally
representative, micro data needed for comprehensive studies like this can only come from
household surveys such as the Nepal Living Standard Survey (NLSS), our ability to examine
more current trends will be constrained by the data. Yet, the period covered here has seen a
major surge in foreign employment and remittance, allowing to identify the implications for
income, poverty, and inequality. Also, while the samples for the NLSS data are quite sizable
with around four 4,000 families from close to 300 Primary Sampling Unites (PSUs) nationwide,
the validity of this analysis and findings will depend on the ability of the survey to accurately
elicit foreign remittance and other monetary and nonmonetary attributes of families.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section examines changes in the magnitudes of
foreign remittance together with their impacts on income, poverty, and inequality. The key
concpetual and operational issues are discussed in section three. The modeling and estimation
issues pertinent to identifying the relationships of foreign remittance with various socioeconomic
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characteristics of the families and migrant workers are discussed and their results reported in
section four. Section five discusses the findings paying particular attention to the changing
socioeconomic contexts in Nepal and the final section concludes with some observations for
policy and further research.

II. Changes in Foreign Remittance, Income, Poverty, and Inequality
Foreign employment and increasing remittance coming with it are affecting a large portion of the
population in Nepal. But it is important to understand the context of remittance itself. First, only
a portion of the population with foreign employment remits money to their families back-home.
Migrant workers accompanied by their families outside of the country do not count as they do
not typically remit money. Second, the NLSS data utilized here include within country transfer
as remittance as long as this involves sending money to someone residing in a different part of
the country. But this analysis uses remittance in the strictest sense of receiving transfer money
from workers in other countries including India.
Used in this sense, the number of families receiving remittance as well as the amount of
money received as remittance increased markedly during 1996 and 2004, the years in which the
first and second rounds of NLSS were conducted.2 As Table 1 indicates, the period saw the
proportion of families receiving foreign remittance increase from 11 percent to 18 percent. While
the 2004 wave of the survey had larger sample size, the number of families receiving foreign
remittance increased beyond that. Put differently, whereas the sample size increased by 18
percent, the number of families with foreign remittance almost doubled.
(Table 1)
Table 1 also reports that the average value of foreign remittance almost doubled during the
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period. It is typical for incomes to increase over time. What is atypical, however, is the size of
the increase even after accounting for inflation indicating that on average families could expect
to double their remittance receipts if they continued to receive remittance at both the beginning
and end of the period. On a per capita basis, this increase represented greater than 100 percent, a
sign that families receiving remittance tended to be increasingly smaller. Whereas the total
income of the families receiving foreign remittance increased by over one half in real terms, the
share of remittance to total the family income3 also increased 13 percentage points. Furthermore,
increase in the remittance income was so large that the average remittance received by families
in the entire population would be up over 200 percent during the period. The average family
income including all sources increased 37 percent and the ratio of remittance to family income
increased eight percentage points suggesting that foreign remittance played a major role in
stabilizing if not increasing the family as well as per capita income in Nepal.
Increasing income can be expected to reduce both poverty and inequality if the increases are
spread out benefiting the poor and lower income strata of the population. What happened during
the period in Nepal also supports this scenario with remittance helping to lower poverty
headcount ratios. Table 2 shows that foreign remittance alone reduced poverty headcount ratios
by over two percent in 1996 and four percent in 2004.4 There is also a wide variation of this
negative effect of remittance on poverty across the urban and rural areas as well as the
development regions. This also altered over time suggesting that the relatively large advantage
enjoyed by the Far Western region was taken over by the smaller advantages in favor of different
urban areas including Kathmandu and the Western region. What is surprising, however, is the
drastic decline in the effect to almost zero in Far West where the proportion of families receiving
remittance more than doubled.5 Yet, the overall size of the poverty reducing effect increased

7

during the period with many families counting on remittance as an important source of income to
avoid poverty. The observation of positive effects of remittance on reducing poverty is consistent
with findings elsewhere (Adams 2005; Adams et al. 2008; Gustafsson and Makonnen 1993; Du
et al. 2005). In Nepal, consumption poverty estimates from the NLSS data also show similar
effects— Lokshin et al. (2007), for example, claim these poverty reducing effects of remittance
to be about one fifth of 11 percent (or little over two percent). But this, together with the
observation that remittance increased very rapidly during the period making up over 14 percent
of the family income in the entire population, causes one to be skeptical about the benefits of
remittance accruing to the low income groups.
Table 3 attempts to quantify the effects of foreign remittance on income inequality using Gini
index of family income. Just like the case of poverty, data suggest that remittance helped reduce
income inequality for both years surveyed. The degree of inequality reduced by foreign
remittance is relatively small with the actual inequality reducing effects estimated at around two
percent for 1996 and four percent for 2004. But the size of the effect varied considerably across
the urban and rural areas as well as development regions with Kathmandu and the Eastern and
Central regions experiencing the smallest gain in reducing inequality. Remittance played the
greatest inequality reducing role in the Mid West and Far West, the two regions with the lowest
per capita incomes. Although a smaller effect in the West is not in line with the case of poverty
reducing effect that was found to be consistent given the changes in the proportion of recipient
families, as the region had the highest proportion of families with remittance, the inequality
reducing effect of foreign remittance appears to be lower when the overall level of income is
relatively higher. These data are not consistent with the findings in other countries, where
remittance helped decrease inequality in urban areas and regions that had higher incomes and
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greater inequality (Adams et al. 2008; Barham and Boucher 1998; Gonzalez-Konig and Wodon
2005). But they are consistent with the case of most Latin American countries, where foreign
remittance is likely to either reduce or at least not exacerbate inequality (Fajnzylber and López
2007).

III. Conceptual and Operational Issues
Foreign employment allows otherwise unemployed or underemployed workers to remit money
and support their families back-home. It is not surprising to find negative effects of foreign
remittance on poverty in Nepal (Central Bureau of Statistics 1997, 2004; Lokshin et al. 2005;
NIDS 2008). Since many of the families with members in foreign employment come from low
socioeconomic background, foreign remittance is also expected to lower inequality. This in and
of itself does not constitute enough evidence to conclude that foreign remittance has played
positive roles in reducing poverty and inequality, however. For one, this makes the assumption
that the migrant workers have been at least as equally well off by foreign employment as they
would be otherwise. This may not always be the case as a large number of unsuccessful returnees
have indicated from India and the Middle East (Bhattarai 2005; NIDS 2007, 2008). Second, the
assumption that the migrant workers would not contribute any income to their family had they
been in the country is even more important. The relatively small amounts of reduction in poverty
and inequality could even outgrow had the foreign remittance been replaced by domestic
earnings generated from employment and other sources specific to the migrant worker. Yet, there
is no direct way to incorporate opportunity costs in the calculus. This analysis, therefore,
attempts to go beyond those poverty and inequality reducing effects and uncover the
socioeconomic implications of foreign remittance for different groups of families in society.
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More specifically, the question asked concerns what socioeconomic groups in Nepal have
benefitted the most and what groups the least from foreign employment with implications for
their economic well-being.
Because foreign employment is a means to generate remittance, the degree to which families
in Nepal can benefit from remittance depends on the socioeconomic backgrounds, preparation,
and efforts of the families themselves as well as of their migrant members. For families without
foreign employment, the process of securing it is quite challenging, necessitating enormous
information, preparation, and investment (Bhattarai 2005; NIDS 2007, 2008; Yamakana 2003).
Once families are capable of securing foreign employment, moreover, the country or region of
employment as well as the industry and quality of jobs become crucial with the final outcome on
the value of money remitted depending on the level of information, access to social networks,
and financial investment (Bohra and Massey 2009; Thieme and Wyss 2005; Yamakana 2003).
Under the ‘sustainable livelihood strategy’ framework, migration for employment occurs both
internally and internationally when families faced by vulnerable financial situations attempt to
diversity their income sources and maximize income and enhance sustainable livelihoods (Ellis
2003; Rakodi and Lloyed-Jones 2002; Thieme and Wyss 2005). To draw from the new
economics of labor migration (Stark 1991; Stark and Bloom 1985), whether or not to seek
migration is a decision that depends on the calculation of risks and benefits by the families and
individual members involved. In Nepal, many studies have documented the increasingly
widespread internal migration from rural to urban areas especially in the wake of political
instability and the lack of security and opportunities in rural areas during the late 1990s and early
2000s (Bhandari 2004; Bohra and Massey 2005). Foreign employment is even a bigger step with
prospective migrants having to pass through a lengthy legal process including selection of
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candidates and visa requirements making the outcome less than certain in many cases. But the
suggestion that individuals and families make collective decisions using the available
information as well as their economic and social endowments highlights the role of investment in
successfully pursuing foreign employment as well as in doing so in a desired region, country,
industry, and type of job. In societies like Nepal where enormous ‘push’ factors such as lack of
employment or other resource endowments exist generating greater interest in migration for
employment, the finding that individuals from relatively more deprived families are more likely
to migrate for jobs is quite reasonable (Bhandari 2004; Bohra and Massey 2005; Graner 2001;
NIDS 2007, 2008).
In case of foreign migration, however, the complicated and expensive process of migration
suggests that individuals from more deprived families may not often have the resources needed
to pursue foreign employment. Then, there is the motivational issue with some groups more or
less inclined to migrate than others. The relatively well-endowed Nawars as a group, for
example, are less likely to migrate to other countries for jobs (Lokshin et al. 2007), despite their
willingness to migrate to other areas of the country for employment and business opportunities
(Bhandari 2004) suggesting that internal and external migrants may be subject to different
constraints and opportunity sets.
Given the focus here on the implications of remittance as opposed to that on the determinants
of migration (or the presence or absence of remittance money), it is important to identify which
socioeconomic groups from among the families with migrant members and remittance are more
likely to benefit and which less likely to do so. The hypotheses to test would be that families
with higher socioeconomic backgrounds such as greater income, assets, and skills, higher caste
and ethnic backgrounds, and residence in urban areas especially in the Eastern, Central, and
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Western regions of the country would be likely to benefit more from remittance. While the
livelihood strategy and relative deprivation hypotheses would suggest families with lower
socioeconomic backgrounds to be more likely to migrate and have remittance (Bhandari 2004;
Lokshin et al. 2007; Rakodi and Lloyed-Jones 2002; Thieme and Wyss 2005), the opposite may
hold when it comes to maximizing the benefits from foreign employment and remittance as they
impose different constraints and opportunity sets. Just because one is willing to migrate for jobs
externally does not mean, for example, that the person will be able to do so especially when the
required information, skills, and economic and social resource endowments are not in place. At
the same time, a larger proportion of these migrant workers is likely to settle in the host country
with their family members accompanying them and thus to be filtered out from workers with
remittance, increasing the likelihood that the livelihood strategy and relative deprivations
hypothesis will not hold.
In the entire population, a large proportion of families does not have or cannot afford to have
their members pursue foreign employment and remittance. Some families may have members
employed in other countries and yet do not receive remittance from them. Some families may
wish to have their members in foreign employment but are unable to afford due to inadequate
preparation, skills, or resource endowments. Some families can neither afford to have their
members in foreign employment nor are willing to do so. The last category of families would be
those that choose not to have members in foreign employment despite their abilities to do so. To
the extent that the characteristics of families and migrating members can predict the migration
outcomes and the remittance resulting from them, the amounts of remittance used do not involve
self-selection bias. Their inabilities to do so—quite large in the larger population—however,
would suggest that whether a family has remittance and how much remittance it has involves a
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large self-selection bias, rendering any analysis focusing on the entire population subject to error.
Mitigating this is important to derive accurate results.
Examining the role of socioeconomic status of families in determining the remittance
outcomes would necessitate a multi-pronged approach where family characteristics can be used
to predict the prime socioeconomic status—non-remittance income and assets. This strategy
would be methodologically more appealing for its ability to incorporate the endogenous
character of income and assets, factors that are likely to explain a large part of the variation in
remittance. Given the involvement of multiple endogenous variables, techniques such as
simultaneous equations can help minimize any simultaneous causality bias due to correlated
errors in the instrumental variables framework. Perhaps even more important to minimize the
self-selection bias would, however, be to use some community or group characteristics such as
percent of families in which members have migrated out of the country for jobs and are sending
remittance back-home (Adams et al. 2008; Lokshin et al. 2007). This is with the assumption that
communities with large outflows to other countries will have greater access to information on the
processes and outcomes of migration as well as greater support from experienced migrants for
jobs once emigrated (Lokshin et al. 2007; NIDS 2008; Thieme 2003; Yamakana 2003). These
strategies would allow further robustness analyses of the results. While migration and remittance
decisions are collectively made by the family and its migrating member, this strategy would help
mimic the actual process in which the role of the family is typically limited to helping the
migrant members economically and socially.

IV. Model and Results
The operational strategy involves two models. The first takes the form of an Ordinary Least
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Squares (OLS) regression to predict the amount of foreign remittance received using the
economic resources as well as other individual and family characteristics. The following
specification applies:
R = β 0 + β y (Y − R ) + β wW + Β i x i + Β f x f + ε 1

…

…

(1)

where, R is the foreign remittance income, (Y-R) is the total family income excluding foreign
remittance, W is the total family assets,6 xi is the vector of individual characteristics of the
migrant member (including gender, relationship to the family householder, host region, and
employment industry), xi is the vector of family characteristics (including family size, caste and
ethnicity, and residence in Kathmandu and different rural/urban areas, regions, and ecological
belts), ε is the disturbance term, and β’s are the parameters to be estimated. This model will be
estimated for families with positive remittance receipts using the 1996 and 2004 data separately.
Since the goal is to estimate the effects of the explanatory variables on the size of remittance,
focusing on positive remittance will help avoid any potential self-selection bias. Given that the
data relating to families of different sizes may manifest considerable skewness and the model
may involve misspecification due to omitted variables,7 the OLS regression may not perform
efficiently, invoking the use of Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator.
The second model will take the form of simultaneous equations where foreign remittance is
predicted using the migrant members’ individual characteristics and the socioeconomic resource
variables including assets, non-remittance income, and the ratio of families with remittance. This
technique incorporates the endogenous character of the economic resource variables by using
their predicted values based on the family characteristics. The idea is to incorporate the direct
effects of the individual level variables and community characteristics together with the indirect
effects of family characteristics as mediated by economic resources. Whereas the first model
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(equation 1) excluded data on all families with no foreign remittance, the second model
(equation 2) helps to extend the analysis by incorporating all families with data. The models
would take the following reduced form equation:
…

y = λ + Λ y y + λc C + Λ i xi + Λ f x f + ε 2

…

(2)

where, y is the vector of foreign remittance, non-remittance income, and assets, C is the
community characteristic measured as the ratio of families with foreign remittance at the PSU
level,8 ε2 is the vector of disturbance terms, and λ’s are the parameters to be estimated. Since the
applicable Y and X variables would vary by equations, the parameter estimates would be specific
to the variables used. The following system of equations adds further specificity.
R = δ 0 + δ y (Y − R ) + δ wW + ∆ i x i + ζ 1

…

…

(3)

(Y − R ) = φ 0 + Φ f x f + ζ 2

…

…

(4)

W = ψ 0 + ψ y (Y − R ) + Ψ f x f + ζ 3

…

…

(5)

These three equations show how the remittance income is determined with non-remittance
income and assets as the endogenous variables. The right hand side elements of the nonremittance income (4) and assets (5) equations are different in that the former, just like total
income, cumulates into the latter but the converse does not hold especially when it remains idle
as in the form of unproductive real estate.9 Even though the family characteristics one shown to
be exactly alike between the non-remittance income and assets equations, variations will occur in
the actual model estimation helping to identify the equations. Conceptually, the effects of such
variables as location, caste and ethnicity, and family size tend to be common whereas those of
householders’ gender, age, and education do not. More specifically, this latter set of variables
would have larger roles to play in determining the current family income than in determining
assets. This constraint is also reasonable because indirect effects of these variables on asset
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formation can be channeled through the effects of non-remittance income. Using this system of
equations helps minimize any simultaneous causality bias arising from the exclusion of any one
endogenous variable as in an instrumental variables regression to be estimated using the two
stage least squared procedure. Statistically, simultaneous equations are shown to be
asymptotically equivalent to and more efficient than the iterative instrumental variables
regressions with augmented residuals especially when multiple endogenous variable equations
are involved (Qian and Schmidt 1997; Wooldridge 2009).
Results from the estimation of the first model are presented in Table 4. Given that the OLS
regression did exhibit signs of heteroskedasticity, the GLS estimator was used to estimate the
model.10 The model has relatively small predictive power for both years with the 1996 version
holding slightly smaller predictive power due partly to the more restrictive sample size. This,
together with a relatively large root mean squared errors (RMSE), suggests that the model can
explain only a part of the variation in foreign remittance across families. While increasing the
explanatory power and minimizing omitted variables bias is desirable, it would be overly
ambitious to expect a very high explanatory power given the reality that explaining variations
goes beyond what can be captured in this model using existing data. The fact that families with
zero remittance have been excluded to avoid self selection bias has also contributed to this small
explanatory power. Yet, the model does not contain any further sign of heteroskedasticity as
indicated in the Breusch-Pagam test and that of pronounced multicollinearity as evidenced by
low correlations and variance inflated factors (Wooldridge 2009). The model estimates are also
largely well-behaved with consistently negative but insignificant roles of non-remittance income
and the positive and significant roles of assets. More specifically, the current non-remittance
income does not show any significant relationship with the amount of foreign remittance
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received whereas asset-holding shows it for both years after controlling for the roles of many
sender and family characteristics.
(Table 4)
Of the sender characteristics used, the coefficients on female, immediate family member, and
other countries than the Middle East and East Asia were consistently significant while that on
agricultural employment was significant in 1996 and those on the Middle East and East Asia
were significant in 2004. For both years, results suggest that female migrants tended to remit less
money compared to their male counterparts and that immediate family members such as sons,
daughters, or parents of the recipients were likely to remit more money than other counterparts.
The role of employment industry, which were captured as agriculture, non-agriculture, and
students or others,11 was partly significant in 1996 with those employed in agriculture as well as
students and others likely to send less money. In case of the specific most regions, however,
while the results show other regions than the Middle East and East Asia as generating more
remittance for both years, these regional categorizations have been less than consistent. First,
these regions are compared against India and other South Asian countries (including Bangladesh
and Maldives) making this region the last in the amounts of remittance received. Second, the
category East Asia was not included in the 1996 data with these countries embedded in the
category of others.
Of the family characteristics focusing exclusively on the geographies, caste and ethnicities,
and family size, only the rural areas, Eastern region, Terai belt, lower caste Hindus, Newars, and
family size showed significant coefficients for 1996. The results that the lower caste Hindus,
Newars, and those from the Terai belt were likely to receive significantly less remittance and that
larger families were likely to receive more remittance are also consistent between 1996 and
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2004. What were inconsistent were the positive coefficients on the Kathmandu valley, rural
areas, Eastern region, and Mountain of which the Eastern region tended to enjoy significantly
greater remittance for families in 1996 whereas other categories to enjoy larger remittance in
2004. Even more anomalous was the coefficient on Terai belt, as its negative sign in 1996 was
transformed into positive by 2004. The Mid Western region and Muslims, in contrast, tended to
experience significantly smaller remittances in 2004.
Results from the estimation of the second model using the three-Stage Least Squared (3SLS)
procedure are reported in Table 5. The intent here is to extend the analysis on the roles of
endogenous income and assets variables and sender and family characteristics using all
observations with data increasing the effective sample size—to 3606 for 1996 and 4263 for
2004. The results including the fit indices and individual coefficients are also organized by the
endogenous variables. The instrumental variable used to control for the role of community
characteristics to increase the predictive power of the models quite sizably—by over 10 percent
for both years—reaffirming its relevance. Yet, as with the case of GLS regression, the
explanatory power of the models is not very high with relatively larger RMSE’s. Even smaller
predictive powers apply to the two endogenous variables since not all relevant variables to
determine the non-remittance income and assets have been captured.
(Table 5)
The coefficient signs on non-remittance income and assets and their significance are largely
consistent between the 3SLS and GLS regressions. Whereas the coefficient on non-remittance
income was insignificant in the 2004 GLS model, the 3SLS model detected its significance for
2004. Results here reaffirm the positive role of assets on the amount of foreign remittance with
the application of simultaneous equations model with an added instrumental variable enabling to
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identify the negative role of non-remittance income on foreign remittance for families in 2004.
Between the endogenous variables, the hypothesized relationship that the coefficient on nonremittance income for assets would be positive as the former cumulates into the latter is
supported. In this sense, non-remittance income has indirect relationship with foreign remittance
for 1996 whereas it has both direct and indirect relationship mediated through assets for 2004.
For 1996, non-remittance income positively affects assets, which then increases foreign
remittance. For 2004, however, even though non-remittance income has positive indirect effects
on foreign remittance, its direct effects are larger, rendering the ultimate net effects to be
negative.12
The coefficients on many of the sender and family characteristics appear to be consistently
significant. Of greater importance, however, are the sender characteristics to see if the results are
consistent with those from the GLS regression. Unsurprisingly, many of the coefficients
including on female, immediate family member, Middle East, East Asia, and other countries are
consistent in the signs. Nevertheless signs of the coefficients on the sibling of the recipient,
agricultural employment, and students and others are inconsistent. This inconsistency has
contributed to their greater insignificance, making their roles in determining the value of foreign
remittance spurious at best. The role of family characteristics in foreign remittance is conceived
to be only through their effects on assets and non-remittance income. First, many of the
coefficients are different in signs and sometimes in significance between the non-remittance and
assets models. This may in part manifest the vulnerability of the estimates to different
methodology and model specifications. At the same time, some of the results highlight
differences in the process of determining non-remittance income and assets for families.
Residence in the Kathmandu valley, for example, has consistently positive coefficients whereas
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that in rural areas has consistently negative coefficients for non-remittance income and assets.
The coefficients on more aggregate regions and belts appear to be inconsistent either on the sign
or significance. In the same vein, whereas the coefficients on castes and ethnicities are somewhat
more consistent with the Lower Caste Hindus (LCH) and Janjatis consistently behind the High
Caste Hindus (HCH), those on family size are consistently significant and positive. Between the
GLS and simultaneous equations models, while the coefficients are only somewhat consistent on
urban/rural residence, regionality, and castes and ethnicities, those on family size are highly
consistent supporting the fact that larger families make greater foreign remittances more likely.

V. Findings and Discussions
Results from the models estimated above have been presented as the determinants of foreign
remittance for those with non-zero remittance and for the entire sample separately. Conventional
interpretation of the estimates representing the degrees of relationship between the dependent
and explanatory variables would be in terms of the likelihood of different socioeconomic groups
of receiving foreign remittance. Results from the first model are also useful to sort out
implications of foreign remittance for different socioeconomic groups with remittance in Nepal.
Results from the second model provide evidence to extend the analysis with the incorporation of
the ratio of families with foreign remittance at the community level helping to mimic how the
amounts of remittance are determined and can be explained.
At a broader level, the model estimates highlight a number of findings relevant to identify the
socioeconomic implications of foreign remittance. First, evidence is highly consistent that
families with greater assets are the ones to maximize their foreign remittance with this
relationship getting stronger over time. While the relatively better performance of the log-log

20

specification indicates the relationship to be non-linear with the positive role of assets
attenuating with their greater increases, assets are found to be the most consistent predictor of
foreign remittance. On the face of it, it is reasonable to find that families with greater asset
endowments are able to afford to have their members in foreign employment generating greater
amounts of remittance in return. Given that making the specific job opportunities in a far away
land a reality necessitates enormous investment in preparation and information access (Bhattarai
2005; Bohra and Massey 2009; NIDS 2007, 2008; Yamakana 2003), those with ability to afford
are expected to generate larger foreign remittance. Without financial investment, for example,
families cannot even apply for specific job opportunities that are typically processed through
different manpower agencies in Nepal, to apply for visa, or to pay for the required travel costs.
These costs also tend to rise with better employment prospects with manpower agencies
attaching applications for certain countries or industries with lucrative job offers with greater
processing or visa fees. Some families are able to borrow to pay for these necessary expenses but
borrowing does not come without costs and lenders are not ready to lend without certain assets in
the form of real estate, house, or business as collateral. It must be conceded that the measurement
of current assets does not fully capture the amount of assets available to fund the migration
processing at the time it occurred as the stock of assets may change due to many factors
including the foreign remittance itself. But it provides a reasonable basis to examine the role of
one’s ability to invest especially given that asset formation is a rather lengthy process taking
years if not decades to realize and thus the assets captured in the data may apply for a reasonable
length of time.
At a theoretical level, however, the finding that greater assets are associated with greater
foreign remittance may not directly support the livelihood strategy hypothesis that suggests that

21

families with financial vulnerability pursue foreign employment to sustain their livelihoods (Ellis
2003; Rakodi and Lloyed-Jones 2002; Thieme and Wyss 2005). But the facts that foreign
remittance requires prior investment and that families typically pursue foreign employment to
diversify their earning portfolio are consistent with the livelihood strategy framework (Rafique,
Massey, and Rogally 2006). To make larger gains, one would be expected to make greater
investments requiring greater resource endowments. Also, almost all of the families with foreign
remittance had some non-remittance income with most reporting employment, business, and/or
agricultural incomes. This strategy may have further institutionalized in rural as well as urban
areas in Nepal during the period covered here and beyond as the political instability and financial
insecurity forced people to find ways to support themselves. This is even more important when
social insurance and security is unavailable at the institutional level and parents increasingly
count on their offspring for longer term security of their own.
Yet, when the amount of foreign remittance is directly related with assets, families without
other alternatives may not be the only ones to utilize foreign employment. The finding is not
fully consistent with the positive poverty and inequality reducing effects of foreign remittance
reported in Tables 1 and 2. If those with greater assets are the ones to reap greater benefits from
foreign employment, the argument that the bottom stratum of the families would see their
relative economic positions improve in society as supported by the relative deprivation
hypothesis (Bhandari 2004; Stark 1991; Stark and Bloom 1985) cannot be meaningfully
sustained. Under this hypothesis, families compare their economic positions vis-à-vis those of
others in their own and other societies and utilize migration and foreign employment as a way to
improve their relative positions. The results suggest, however, that foreign employment may not
have reduced inequality even though the Gini indices may have reduced slightly. The reason has
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partly to do with the way inequality was measured using income as the indicator without any
connection between income earning capacity and assets. Once these interconnections between
assets and income are incorporated, as in the GLS regression but more so in the 3SLS regression
(Wagle 2006a), the inequality reducing effect of remittance cannot hold, suggesting that the true
implications of remittance are more complicated to assess than what descriptive statistics provide
them to be.
There can be a valid argument that the livelihood strategy or relative deprivation hypotheses
are not based on what happens at the top of the distribution as long as remittance helps lower
poverty. Focusing on the assets-remittance nexus alone does not provide the complete picture of
who benefits from remittance since it is the income that is more related to economic well-being
and poverty. The second important finding therefore concerns the relationship between foreign
remittance and non-remittance income, the evidence on which appears to be highly fragile. The
GLS regression did not detect any significant relationship for families receiving foreign
remittance. The 3SLS regression that incorporated the direct as well as indirect relationships
suggested that while the indirect relationship is positive especially for 2004, even larger direct
and negative relationship would lead to the net relationships to be negative. The findings
therefore suggest that how large the amounts of foreign remittance families with at least some
foreign remittance would be likely to receive would not depend on their non-remittance income.
The larger sample including all families, on the other hand, indicated that the interrelationships
between foreign remittance and non-remittance income may have changed over time. Whereas
the non-remittance income was positively related to foreign remittance through assets in 1996,
the net relationship was negated for 2004 as its direct positive relationship was larger than its
indirect negative relationship.
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Non-remittance sources and foreign remittance constitute two separate types of income
sources with the former deriving from activities within the country and the latter from outside of
the country. Not every migrant worker sends money and not everyone sends the equal proportion
of the earned money. Even following the livelihood strategy framework, families tend to have
different sources of income including employment, self-employment, agriculture, house rental,
and investment in stocks, real estates, or businesses. Even though seemingly unrelated, the two
forms of income may be highly interrelated with foreign remittance helping to form assets which
is then invested for income generation. On the contrary, foreign remittance may encourage other
family members to shun employment or other income generating activities, putting negative
pressures on non-remittance income. This may be the case especially when the chief breadwinner
in the family has migrated out of the country leaving other adult(s) at home with dependent
children. What is clear with these caveats in mind, however, is that foreign remittance tended to
go to those families that already had greater non-remittance income in 1996. This in essence is to
say that the Matthew-effect prevailed making the rich richer and poor poorer. This may have
changed by 2004 in an important way as families with smaller non-remittance income tended to
receive greater foreign remittance, with other things being equal, indicating that a slightly
different set of families may have utilized foreign employment. Increasingly, for example,
members from smaller and nuclear families may have adopted foreign employment to support
and sustain livelihood especially in response to the increasing paucity of employment
opportunities in Nepal. This is not to suggest that smaller families may have received greater
foreign remittance, on which the evidence is quite the contrary. But while the proportion of
families with remittance has increased over time, data show that these families have also been
smaller, decreasing in size from an average of 6.55 members to 6.07 members.
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It must also be noted that the amounts of foreign remittance vary greatly across families with
the mean values reported in Table 1 not providing a complete picture. Whereas the sample mean
of remittance in 1996 was over NPR 21,000, the median was less than its 40 percent. In 2004, by
comparison, the average remittance was valued at over NPR 41,000 with the median value less
than 37 percent. Anyone with some knowledge of income structure would know that a median in
a typical distribution would be lower than its mean but the fact that the former is less than 40
percent and increasingly lower for the foreign remittance in Nepal indicates that the distribution
is composed of a large number of small remittances and a small number of very large
remittances. While even small amounts of foreign remittance can help families at the margin of
poverty lines escape poverty, making noticeable dent on poverty headcount ratios, their
contributions to the overall economic well-being may not have been very encouraging for a large
number of families. This same phenomenon appears to be operational in showing that foreign
remittance helps lower poverty, when in fact what is happening is not that the bottom strata of
the distribution are gaining their relative position but that a large number of families are getting
some help to supplement their incomes. In 1996, for example, data show that the bottom 50
percent of the families with foreign remittance had the average remittance receipts of less than
NPR 3,000 and the average non-remittance income of just over NPR 11,000 totaling NPR 14,000
as their family income. In 2004, the average remittance for the bottom 50 percent increased to
NPR 6,000 and the average non-remittance income to NPR 14,000, bringing the family income
to NPR 20,000. When the additional money, however meager in size, is available for families to
count as income, the overall distribution would look more equal helping to improve the Gini
index.
This discussion suggests that, while foreign remittance helped many families avoid poverty,
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this may not have substantively improved the overall economic well-being since most of the
remittance receipts were relatively small. This did not substantively help lower inequality either,
as those receiving large sums of money as foreign remittance possessed greater non-remittance
income and/or assets already.
The third important finding has to do with the characteristics of the migrant workers remitting
money. The hypothesis here was that males, immediate family members, and those in regions
other than India and employed outside of agriculture would be associated with greater
remittances. Findings are quite consistent that female migrants would be likely to remit
significantly lower amounts of money whereas the immediate family members would be likely to
remit greater amounts. Emigration of Nepali women for jobs is a more recent development and
the labor demands in importing countries typically focus on one’s physical strength for menial,
hard work (Bhatarai 2005; NIDS 2007). Given the nature of these labor demands, women have
not been able to compete for these opportunities (Graner 2001). Yet, while the findings capture
the gendered nature of foreign employment and remittance, a very low representation of women
migrant workers (numbering less than four percent) register further caution. The finding on the
relationship of the sender to the recipient is also consistent with the expectation that immediate
family members such as sons, daughters, or parents would be likely to remit more money. They
have greater family attachment and responsibilities than do other relatives including siblings and
thus would provide greater remittances.
Findings on the regions of migration are straightforward even though migration to regions
other than the Middle East and East Asia would be more likely to generate greater remittance
when compared to that to India. It is clear that the countries in the Middle East and East Asia—
the latter were recorded as other countries in the 1996 survey—scored significantly better in
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remittance in 2004. Historically, India has hosted millions of Nepali migrant workers at different
kinds of unskilled jobs, as has Nepal hosted hundreds of thousands of Indian migrant workers,
because of the visa-free mobility policy between them. But India also sends millions of migrant
workers abroad for foreign employment and, even within the country, the recent waves of
export-led growth have generated enormous rural to urban migration, making the domestic labor
market in India not the destination of choice for most Nepali workers (Rafique et al. 2006;
Thieme 2006). Due to enormous competition among job-seekers, employers in India do not offer
competitive wages especially for unskilled labor greatly reducing the prospects for large
remittances. The finding that all other countries than India are likely to generate greater amounts
of remittance for Nepali families is well substantiated. While migration to the Middle East was
not found to significantly increase the expected remittance for Nepali workers, a very low
representation of these cases (less than three percent) warrants further caution. There is also
evidence that the migrant workers employed in agriculture are likely to remit less money
compared to those employed in non-agricultural sectors. The focus on agricultural and nonagricultural sectors was to be consistent with the availability of the data. But the findings are
consistent with reasonable expectations that the agricultural sector is one of the least paid sectors
in labor importing countries. Yet, the positive coefficients produced by the 3SLS regression
models, together with partly significant coefficients on students and others, another category of
employment used, suggest that findings are less than definitive.
Finally, findings have important implications for the different family characteristics focusing
on urban/rural areas, regions, caste and ethnicity, and family size. While the 3SLS regression
with instrumental variables has detected many more significant coefficients, there is some
agreement across the models and years that families from the Kathmandu valley may have
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tended to receive greater foreign remittances compared to those from other urban areas, who in
turn may have been better off than those from rural areas. Given the relative advantages of the
Kathmandu valley on economic resources and the relative disadvantages of rural areas when
compared with other urban areas, the remittance money may have filtered down to rural areas.
Since those from Kathmandu can make large investments and pursue migration to countries and
industries offering better wages, they appear poised to receive a major chunk of the remittance
money. Added to this are the internal migratory patterns especially augmented by the political
turmoil during the late 1990s and early 2000s that those able to afford living in this capital city
would migrate to Kathmandu and those able to afford living in other urban areas with relatively
better security situation than rural areas would migrate there (Wagle 2009c, 2010). Partly, this is
a self selection problem as people choose to live in different parts of the country depending on
their resource endowments and livelihood strategies diversifying their earning portfolio. This is
not to suggest that international migration has not affected rural areas as they have experienced
mass exodus to urban areas especially to Kathmandu as well as to other countries (Bhandari
2004; Graner 2001; Shrestha, Velu, and Conway 1993; Thieme 2006; Thieme and Wyss 2005).
But the ever-enlarging foreign remittance has made increasing contributions to the already
engulfing urban and rural divide in Nepal.
The role of more arbitrarily drawn administrative regions and ecological belts appear to be
largely inconsistent either across the regions or belts or over time. The relatively more
advantaged position of the East and West and the relatively disadvantaged position of the Mid
West compared to the Center appear to be inconsistent across the models and over time. The
same holds for the relatively better positioned Terai and Mountain belts compared to the Hills.
While the Western region and Terai may be catching up with the Center and Hills on the

28

amounts of foreign remittance given the changing internal migration patterns, further research
would be needed to draw more definitive conclusions. One thing that is important, however, is
the specific socioeconomic compositions of these regions and belts that help identify the
implications of foreign employment and remittance.
Given the dominance of a socially embedded hierarchical caste system, there has always been
an assumption that castes and ethnicities have played large roles in economic outcomes (Bista
1991; Gellner 2007; Wagle 2010). Findings here partly support this assumption with the LCH’s,
Newars, and Muslims likely to decrease the amount of foreign remittance compared to the
HCH’s including Brahmins and Chettris. While there are some differences especially with
Muslims’ disadvantaged position documented by the 2004 data and the Newars’ disadvantaged
position perhaps faded by 2004,13 the suggestion has been that these caste and ethnic
backgrounds appear to make the pattern of foreign remittance dominated by the HCH’s with
other things held constant. One interesting finding—better termed as a lack of it—is concerning
the Janjatis around whom much of the ongoing ethnic politics has centered (Gellner 2007).
Although the Janjatis have been perceived to lag significantly behind others and particularly
behind the HCH’s, findings are consistent that their foreign remittance does not appear to be any
smaller than those of the HCH’s. This does not align fully with the results from the 3SLS
regression in determining their non-remittance income and assets and through them foreign
remittance as they apply to the larger population. This inconsistency suggests a need to go
beyond the ethnic identities especially given that this group includes a large number of tribal
denominations that manifest a range of advantages and resources.
Family size is one of the important characteristics the relationship of which has remained
highly consistent across all models and years: larger families are likely to receive greater
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amounts of foreign remittance. This does not mean that families sending migrant workers have
grown in size over time as data show it to be the contrary. Consistent with smaller likelihoods of
poverty for larger families (Wagle 2006b), the positive relationship of family size with
remittance may depend on the ability of larger families to invest in better foreign employment
opportunities ensuring greater return. Another possibility that has not been explored neither is
there a way to do so using the exiting data is whether or not these families tended to have
multiple migrant members pooling remittance money together.

VI. Conclusion
This analysis examined the rising foreign remittance activities in Nepal affecting a large number
of migrant workers, their families, society, and the economy in general. Data were limited to the
years 1996 and 2004, constricting the ability to extend the analysis to the mid-2000s, the period
with enormous acceleration in migration for foreign employment and remittance. The idea was to
identify the socioeconomic implications of foreign remittance on income, poverty, and
inequality. A study of the socioeconomic implications is timely given that foreign remittance has
evolved as one if not the most important source of income and foreign currency in Nepal,
transforming the entire economy into remittance economy and a good proportion of families into
remittance families.
Data suggest that the period registered enormous growth in foreign employment with foreign
remittance constituting 18 percent of the family income in the larger population and close to 63
percent of the family income for those receiving at least some foreign remittance, figures that
were up to 13 percentage points higher in 2004 than in 1996. This increasing remittance income
helped reduce both poverty and inequality by close to four percent suggesting that the bottom

30

strata of the population may have benefited equally if not more highly. Further multivariate
analyses suggested, however, that these observations based purely on descriptive statistics may
be premature. The consistently positive relationship of assets and foreign remittance, for
example, indicated that among the greatest beneficiaries of these remittances may have been the
wealthy with those at the bottom of the wealth distribution receiving marginal amounts. This was
further substantiated by the fact that a large number of families received only a small amount
compared to very few families that received large amounts. Similarly, while the negative
association of non-remittance income with foreign remittance especially for 2004 was partly
consistent with the poverty reducing effects of foreign remittance, a larger portion of the benefits
appeared to have gone to families with considerable amount of non-remittance income.
These findings, together with those on the roles of the sender and family characteristics,
suggest that families to benefit from foreign employment include those with immediate relatives
as the migrant workers especially in countries other than India and those located in urban areas,
HCH’s, and large families. Many other characteristics relevant to examine the implications of
foreign remittance did not show consistent relationships either between the sample of families
with foreign remittance and the larger population, over time, or both. These findings have
important implications for policies on foreign employment and remittance as well as the general
social and economic structure. Whereas the government can count on foreign remittance to lower
extreme poverty, it does not appear to have contributed much toward greater economic wellbeing especially given that it may have some work or business disincentives for the family
members receiving foreign remittance. Since most of the amounts of foreign remittance appear to
be small, without much impact on improving the economic well-being of recipient families, the
eligibility criteria especially for foreign employment outside of India may need to target low
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income groups from rural areas. The government may also need to keep cost of information on
foreign employment low by offering greater information outreach. While the recipients of
foreign remittance appear to be somewhat random by geography or ethnicity, greater policy
efforts are needed to promote foreign employment among the LCH’s, Newars, and Muslims
especially for countries other than India. Efforts are also needed to lessen the increasing
inequality of income and particularly assets due to foreign employment that have caused further
economic disparities in society.
Analytical findings can be as valid as the data render them to be. Survey data like these can
have large measurement errors especially when the specific subsample under consideration is
largely self selected without much control of the researcher. While more efficient econometric
strategies help mitigate these potential biases, they cannot completely remove them. Larger
samples of remittance families would help examine the implications of remittances more
comprehensively. To the extent allowed by data, future research needs to examine issues at
various regional levels as well as for various castes and ethnicities, allowing derivation of more
specific understanding. Focus also needs to be on obtaining more comprehensive profiles of
migrant workers to draw more definitive conclusions about their job characteristics as well as
their pre-migration preparatory and post-migration job experiences.

Notes
1

These English years are used as shorthand even though the actual years they refer to are Nepali fiscal years. The

year 2005, for example, represents the Nepali fiscal year of 2004/2005 with mid-July as the cutoff point.
2

The surveys were conducted during the Nepali fiscal years 1995/1996 and 2003/2004. But the two years are

referred here as 1996 and 2004 even though the actual data collection took place during the entire fiscal years.
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3

Total income aggregates income from all sources including employment, self employment, agriculture, house

rental, business and investment, remittance, and home and in kind production. Although not specifically considered
income, this last category needs to be included to capture the amount of money equivalence that working in family
farms or home production typically brings to the overall economic well-being in this society where a large portion of
the population depends on subsistence agriculture (CBS/Nepal 1996, 2004).
4

The poverty headcount ratios presented in Table 2 appear to be strikingly higher than those reported elsewhere for

Nepal (World Bank 2006) even though the NLSS serves as the unified source of survey data for these computations.
This is even more so when considering that both computations use the same nationally recognized poverty lines. The
major difference, however, has to do with the use of income and consumption as the basis of poverty measurement.
The methodological problems inherent in survey-based income estimates are widely recognized especially in rural
areas where monetary values do not typically enter the calculus of daily family economy. This is also the reason
why consumption estimates are used to measure poverty in most if not all developing countries. These caveats apply
to the higher poverty estimates reported in Table 2. It is also important to remember, however, that the goal here is
not to examine the magnitude of poverty per se but to visit them in order to examine the impact of remittance. And,
the results on this will be valid as long as the methodology applied does not cause bias in any particular direction.
5

During the period, data show that the proportion of families receiving foreign remittance more than tripled in East,

more than doubled in Mid West and Far West, and increased by 34 and 27 percents in Center and West respectively.
6

This is in the form of net-worth including real estate, houses, business and investment, and other liquid assets.

7

These may include factors that are related to education and human capital, motivation, and employment.

8

Ideally, access to greater information about migration would have lagged effects on future migration decisions

especially considering lengthy migration processes. While an ideal approach would be to obtain data from previous
population censuses, matching data at the community level would be exceedingly challenging. The one adopted here
is to construct this variable form the NLSS data so that the findings would be indicative despite some likely
temporal differences. Also, the focus of this analysis on PSUs helps capture more specific contexts than focusing on
more aggregate districts as is the case with Lokshin et al. (2007) in Nepal or even on aggregate ethnicities as is the
case with Adams et al. (2008) in Ghana. Data on a total of 274 PSUs in the 1996 round and on 336 PSUs in the 2004
round of the NLSS would be far more specific and superior than the data on 75 districts.
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9

Whereas Wagle (2006a) found assets to directly affect income and income to indirectly affect asset formation in

Kathmandu, this may not be representative of rural areas where the likelihood of assets remaining idle is greater.
10

While the sampling weights supplied with the data have been used throughout this analysis to make the results

representative of the entire population in the country, a transformed weighting variable was used for the GLS
estimator. The transformation took the form of 1/W, with W signifying the sampling weight.
11

It would be ideal to capture specific industries, occupations, and employment types to examine how the amounts

of remittance vary across countries. But these were not included in the analysis due to data unavailability reasons
thus potentially increasing the omitted variables bias.
12

Evaluated at the sample average, for example, the negative direct effect on foreign remittance turns out to be

about NPR 4.90 for every 100 percent increase in non-remittance income, which is greater than the total, positive
effects estimated at NPR 1.32 as the product of NPR 293.76 (the effect on assets of 100 percent increase in nonremittance income) and NPR 0.45 (the effect on foreign remittance of 100 percent increase in assets).
13

The Newars have traditionally been considered to be at socioeconomic disadvantage compared to the HCH’s. But

they have been able to solidify their position during the period covered here as evidenced by their increasing
incomes and assets (Wagle 2009). When it comes to foreign employment and remittance, however, they appear to
still lag behind, posing questions on their desire to migrate for employment and remit money back to families
(Lokshin et al. 2007).
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Figure 1: Changes in Foreign Remittance (1991-2008)
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Figure 1, Changes in Foreign Remittance (1991-2008)
Source: Ministry of Finance/Nepal (various years); Nepal Rastra Bank (2009)
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Table 1, Income from Foreign Remittance and Total Income (Values in 2004 NPR unless indicated otherwise)
Income and Level
N
All Families
Remittance Income
Total Income
All Individuals
Remittance Income
Total Income
Families with Foreign Remittance
Remittance Income
Total Income
Individuals in Families with Foreign Remittance
Remittance Income
Total Income

1996

2004

Average Value
(NPR)

Average Value
(NPR)

N

% Change
Average Value
(NPR)

N

3,606
3,606

2,422
41,447

4,263
4,263

7,802
56,845

18.22
18.22

222.13
37.15

22,315
22,315

412
7,533

24,153
24,153

1,598
11,944

8.24
8.24

287.86
58.56

380
380

21,229
42,377

750
750

41,157
65,454

97.37
97.37

93.87
54.46

2,505
2,505

3,611
6,955

4,613
4,613

8,430
12,817

84.15
84.15

133.45
84.28

a

Table 2, The Effect of Foreign Remittance on Poverty Headcount Ratios (Values are percentages based on non-negative incomes)
1996
Coverage
Urban and Rural Areas
Kathmandu Valley
All Urban Areas
All Rural Areas
Development Regions
East
Center
West
Mid West
Far West
Nepal

NonRemittance
Income

Total
Income

2004
Effect of
Remittance
b

(% )

NonRemittance
Income

Total
Income

Effect of
Remittance
b

(% )

12.00
39.05
76.44

11.59
38.36
74.67

-3.39
-1.78
-2.31

11.60
31.21
86.76

10.39
27.28
83.59

-10.48
-12.58
-3.65

70.73
66.14
80.98
84.45
90.40
75.07

69.47
64.96
77.46
82.72
46.48
73.23

-1.78
-1.79
-4.35
-2.05
-48.58
-2.45

83.10
80.62
74.11
76.05
79.36
80.28

84.62
79.83
62.91
74.38
77.74
76.95

1.82
-0.98
-15.12
-2.20
-2.04
-4.15

c

Notes:
a. The aggregate poverty lines for individuals were estimated to be NPR 5,089 and NPR 7,696 in 1996 and 2004 respectively. But the values in
this table are based on the specific poverty lines applicable to Kathmandu, other urban areas, and rural areas in the Western and Eastern Hill
and Western and Eastern Terai for 1996 and 2004. See World Bank (2006) for details.
b. Poverty reducing effects of remittance.
c. This positive effect results from the larger sizes of poor families and not from negative remittance.
Table 3, The Effect of Foerign Remittance on Income Inequality (The reported Gini indices are based on non-negative incomes)
1996
Coverage

Urban and Rural Areas
Kathmandu Valley
All Urban Areas
All Rural Areas
Development Regions
East
Center
West
Mid West
Far West
Nepal
Note: a. Inequality reducing effects of remittance

NonRemittance
Income

Total
Income

2004
Effect of
Remittance
a

(% )

NonRemittance
Income

Total
Income

Effect of
Remittance
a

(% )

0.507
0.561
0.496

0.507
0.557
0.484

0.000
-0.713
-2.419

0.513
0.562
0.520

0.512
0.547
0.504

-0.195
-2.669
-3.077

0.470
0.591
0.546
0.683
0.485
0.600

0.469
0.590
0.524
0.664
0.452
0.590

-0.213
-0.169
-4.029
-2.782
-6.804
-1.667

0.528
0.627
0.580
0.583
0.579
0.608

0.518
0.619
0.549
0.555
0.526
0.586

-1.894
-1.276
-5.345
-4.803
-9.154
-3.618
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Table 4, GLS Regression of Foreign Remittance (For families with remittance)
1996

Description
Non-remittance income (Log)
Assets (Log)
Sender Characteristics
Female
Son, daughter, or parent of the recipient
Sibling of the recipient
Middle East
East Asia
Other Countries
Employed in agriculture
Students or others
Family Characteristics
Kathmandu Valley
Rural areas
East
West
Mid West
Far West
Mountain Belt
Terai Belt
Middle Caste Hindus
Lower caste Hindus
Newar
Janjatis (tribal groups)
Muslims
Other ethnicities/religions
Family size
Constant
N
R-Squared
Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE)
Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01

Coefficient
-0.005
0.122

2004

Standard Error
0.054
0.046 **

Coefficient
-0.076
0.076

-1.385
0.847
-0.322
1.179
1.078
-0.789
-0.972

0.319
0.178
0.253
1.250
0.338
0.240
0.449

-0.587
0.708
-0.241
1.661
1.768
1.658
-0.260
-0.452

0.277
0.102
0.201
0.124
0.172
0.223
0.166
0.382

1.548
1.270
0.755
-0.216
-0.072
-0.420
0.085
-0.450
0.326
-0.576
-1.734
-0.025
0.113
0.029
0.118
5.624
380
0.414
1.330

1.581
0.607
0.282
0.274
0.325
0.377
0.532
0.207
0.387
0.292
0.486
0.207
0.289
0.711
0.025
1.039

0.811
-0.288
-0.262
0.422
-0.476
-0.111
0.494
0.325
-0.220
-0.621
-0.510
-0.118
-0.413
0.238
0.084
8.460
750
0.452
1.161

0.397
0.163
0.137
0.141
0.161
0.184
0.212
0.107
0.176
0.129
0.255
0.114
0.197
0.540
0.016
0.539
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**
**

**
**
*

*
**

*
*
**

**
**

Standard Error
0.039
0.027 **
*
**
**
**
**

*

**
**
*
**
**
*
*
**
**

Table 5, 3SLS Regression of Foreign Remittance, Non-Remittance Income, and Assets (For all families)
Description
Foreign Remitance (Log)
Non-remittance income (Log)
Assets (Log)
Ratio of families with foreign remittance
Female
Son, daughter, or parent of the recipient
Sibling of the recipient
Middle East
East Asia
Other Countries
Employed in agriculture
Students or others
Constant
R-Squared
Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE)
Non-remittance income (Log)
Kathmandu Valley
Rural areas
East
West
Mid West
Far West
Mountain Belt
Terai Belt
Middle Caste Hindus
Lower caste Hindus
Newar
Janjatis (tribal groups)
Muslims
Other ethnicities/religions
Family size
Householder Female
Househonder's age
Householder with at least 12 years of schooling
Constant
R-Squared
Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE)
Assets (Log)
Non-remittance income (Log)
Kathmandu Valley
Rural areas
East
West
Mid West
Far West
Mountain Belt
Terai Belt
Middle Caste Hindus
Lower caste Hindus
Newar
Janjatis (tribal groups)
Muslims
Other ethnicities/religions
Family size
Constant
R-Squared
Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE)
Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01

1996 (N = 3606)

2004 (N = 4263)

Coefficient

Standard Error

Coefficient

Standard Error

-0.163
0.144
6.446
-0.811
3.881
0.829
6.932
7.155
0.814
1.856
-0.172
0.371
2.259

0.091
0.059
0.291
0.227
0.188
0.208
1.254
0.430
0.150
0.499
0.820

-0.308
0.389
5.888
-0.657
3.513
0.289
7.036
8.078
8.677
0.393
-0.298
-1.719
0.520
2.653

0.088
0.063
0.250
0.213
0.157
0.207
0.229
0.334
0.409
0.188
0.348
0.767

**
**
**
**
**

1.063
-0.237
-0.099
-0.306
-0.281
-0.494
-0.090
0.204
-0.116
-0.026
-0.287
-0.157
0.024
0.480
0.086
-0.604
-0.002
0.797
9.935
0.214
1.022

0.136
0.084
0.047
0.051
0.059
0.069
0.066
0.043
0.091
0.053
0.090
0.046
0.081
0.107
0.006
0.051
0.001
0.127
0.109

**
**
*
**
**
**

0.981
-0.622
0.020
-0.067
-0.004
-0.232
0.024
0.282
-0.482
-0.081
0.092
-0.221
-0.283
0.107
0.088
-0.550
-0.006
0.999
10.431
0.307
0.976

0.089
0.049
0.041
0.044
0.052
0.065
0.061
0.035
0.069
0.049
0.064
0.037
0.074
0.190
0.006
0.038
0.001
0.077
0.082

**
**

0.282
-0.013
-0.624
-0.423
0.083
-0.235
-0.360
-0.325
-0.240
-0.975
-0.983
-0.456
-0.284
-1.136
0.052
0.121
9.659
0.175
1.573

0.088
0.234
0.132
0.074
0.085
0.096
0.117
0.103
0.069
0.142
0.083
0.142
0.073
0.125
0.173
0.012
0.878

**

0.214
0.375
-0.443
-0.119
0.553
0.235
0.469
0.153
0.133
-0.305
-1.239
0.199
-0.690
-1.197
-0.633
0.122
10.109
0.173
1.712

0.068
0.171
0.098
0.071
0.077
0.089
0.114
0.106
0.066
0.124
0.086
0.111
0.067
0.130
0.330
0.011
0.697
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*
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

**

**
**
**
**
**
**
**

**
**
*
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

**
**
**
*
*

**
**
**

**
**
**
**
**
**
**

**
*
**
**
**
**
*
*
**
**
**
**
**

